INTRODUCTION
Strategic complexity and bounded rationality in the context of repeated games have been extensively studied. Among the numerous directions of inquiry in this area we are interested in how equilibrium outcomes are affected when we impose an exogenous restriction on the sets of strategies available to the players by means of finite automata and bounded recall. For other complexity and rationality issues and approaches to them, the Ž . reader is referred to a survey by Kalai 1990 .
Finite automata and bounded recall are possible alternatives to describe strategies in a repeated game which have ''finite memories.'' As suggested Ž . in Aumann 1981 , such formulations put bounds on the complexity of strategies and enable an analysis in the framework of finite games. A memory may be interpreted as a ''state of the player's mind.'' Restricting strategies to those with a finite memory thus amounts to postulating limitations on the amount of information a player can process in deciding what to do in the course of a play. An example of such a constraint is the inability to count the number of stages played. Alternatively, one can think of a player using an external device, such as a computer, to carry out his plans, and this machine has some hardware constraints.
In the case of an automaton, memories are represented by its states. To each state is assigned an action to be taken whenever the automaton is at that state. Starting at a prespecified initial state, an automaton undergoes the transition of its states according to a rule which determines the next state as a function of the current state and the other players' actions at the last stage.
1 The more states an automaton has, the more complicated is the strategyᎏdepending on the greater variety of past actionsᎏthat it can carry out. Thus the number of states of an automaton, called the size of that automaton, serves to distinguish quantitatively between ''simple'' and ''complicated'' strategies. On the other hand, bounded recall limits how far back in the past a player can remember, i.e., the length of recall. Such a strategy can be represented by a function that assigns actions only to the sequences of past actions with a limited length. In the early stages of the game, however, the sequence of actual actions may be too short for this function to be ''activated'' to play a repeated game. In order to fulfill the time span required, a surrogate memoryᎏformally termed an initial memoryᎏis introduced.
2 Again, the longer the length of recall, the more complicated the patterns of actions a player can take.
Ž . Aumann 1981 also includes a study of the undiscounted infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with a special case of finite memory, due to Aumann, Cave, and Kurz: action at each stage is allowed to depend only on the last action taken by the other player; i.e., the length of recall is 1. Such strategies are called ''reactive'' and can be implemented by automata with at most two states. They examine the payoff matrix of this restricted Ž . game 8 = 8 bimatrix and show that the process of successive weak domination eliminates all but ''Tit-for-Tat'' strategies for both players. The 1 This type of automaton, which we will use in this paper, is sometimes called an exact automaton. In contrast, a full automaton takes into account all players' actions. Depending on the issues and questions addressed, each of the two types has its advantage. See Kalai Ž . Ž . Ž . 1990 , Section 4.1, and also Neyman 1997 , Section 7. The results in Kalai 1990 are stated in terms of full automata.
2 Again, there are two alternatives for the domain of such a function: only other players' actions or all players' actions. Unlike our choice for automata, we will take the second alternative for bounded recall. In Section 7.2 we will show that bounded recall can be viewed as a special case of automata.
Ž . outcome is cooperation at every stage. See also Kalai et al. 1988 for the discounted case.
Another study of repeated prisoner's dilemma with complexity bounds is Ž . Ž . found in Neyman 1985 . He studies a finitely repeated undiscounted version in which the players are restricted to the strategies that are implementable by automata of bounded sizes. It is well known that, without any restriction on the set of strategies, every strategic equilibrium of this game leads to defections, or double-crossing, throughout the 3 Ž . stages. Neyman 1985 states that if the bounds are so small that the players are unable to count up to the last stage, then cooperation can prevail at every stage in equilibrium. Furthermore, even if players are allowed to use automata of much larger sizes, e.g., any power of the number of repetitions, one can still achieve cooperation at most of the stages provided that the game is sufficiently long. More general results on the set of equilibrium payoffs of finitely repeated two-person games with Ž . bounded automata can be found in Neyman 1998 . See also Papadimitriou Ž . Ž . and Yannakakis 1994 and Zemel 1989 . Ž . In Neyman 1998 , questions and results are formalized as the asymptotics of equilibrium outcomes of the restricted repeated games. He considers a sequence of finitely repeated two-person games that are parameterized by the number of repetitions and bounds on the size of automata for each player. The main theorem of this paper specifies the condition on the order of magnitude of these parameters under which the set of equilibrium payoffs converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs as the parameters tend to infinity.
This approach has been useful in that it provides a framework to study a set of seemingly different questions concerning repeated games with finite Ž . automata or bounded recall. For example, Ben-Porath 1993 studies undiscounted infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum games. His investigation centers around the question regarding how much of an advantage a bigger automaton has over a smaller one. Suppose that players 1 and 2 are Ž . restricted to strategies implementable by automata of size n and m n Ž . ) n , respectively. The results are stated in terms of the asymptotics of the value of the restricted game V as n ª ϱ. Interestingly, a player n, mŽ n.
with a larger bound has an advantage only if his bound is exponentially larger than the other player's bound. Otherwise, the player with a smaller bound can asymptotically secure the value of the one-shot game. Even being polynomially bigger than the other bound is not big enough. For- 3 Let us remark that the proof of this statement is more subtle than the simple backward induction argument which is sometimes erroneously given in the literature. One shows by induction that, at any equilibrium path, the actions in the last k stages of the game are Ž . defect, defect with probability 1. mally, log m n Ž . Study of the zero-sum two-person case is important for that of the non-zero-sum case; it provides insights into individually rational levels and effective punishments, and thus the set of equilibrium payoffs. See Ben- Porath 1993 , Sect. 4 , Lehrer 1988 , Sect. 5.5 , and also Lehrer 1994 . More recent results and open problems in this line of research can be Ž . found in Neyman 1997 .
In this paper we study repeated two-person zero-sum games in which a player, say player 1, with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player, player 2. Concerning the values of such games, two questions arise: ''What is the number of repetitions needed for player 2 to take advantage of player 1's restriction?'', and ''How long can player 1 protect himself against an unrestricted player 2?'' The questions are again formulated as the asymptotic behavior of the value of the repeated game: ''What is the relationship between the number of repetitions and the Ž . complexity bound so that, as they tend to infinity, either a player 2 can hold player 1's payoff down to his one-shot game maxmin value in pure Ž . actions or b player 1 can still secure the value of the one-shot game?'' Ž . Neyman 1997 has conjectures on these questions for repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall. The present work has stemmed from Ž . an attempt to resolve the conjecture corresponding to question a above. Precise statements of the conjectures will be given in Section 7.
Our approach is to deduce the results concerning the value of a repeated game with finite automata and bounded recall from a result concerning the ''maxmin'' value of a repeated game with a restriction directly on the set of mixed strategies.
Note that finite automata and bounded recall limit the set of pure strategies in a repeated game. However, any mixture on the restricted set of pure strategies is allowed. Geometrically, this amounts to saying that the set of strategies is restricted to a face of the mixed strategy simplex. Since a face of a simplex is a compact convex set, the value of the repeated game with finite automata or bounded recall exists by the minimax theorem.
In contrast, we impose a restriction directly on mixed strategies. To this end we employ an information theoretic quantity called entropy. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty of random variables and is a functional of probability distributions. Every mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies and thus its entropy is well defined. To define strategic entropy, however, we will take into account the uncertainty of a mixed strategy relative to the other player's strategy. Specifically, we look at the probability distribution on the play induced by a pair of strategies and its entropy. The strategic entropy of a mixed strategy is then defined to be the maximum entropy of the play with respect to the other player's strategy. Thus it is the maximum uncertainty of the play that the other player faces against that mixed strategy.
We restrict player 1's strategies to those that have strategic entropy less than a prespecified bound. A mixed strategy with a small strategic entropy would be ''not so uncertain'' and hence ''close'' to a pure strategy, and vice versa. We argue that a strategy with relatively little strategic entropy Ž . compared to the number of repetitions eventually ''reveals'' its pure actions in the course of a play, and an unrestricted player may take advantage of it. To be more precise, our main theorem states that if the bound on strategic entropy is of a smaller order than the number of repetitions, then the maxmin value for player 1 in the restricted game is asymptotically his one-shot game maxmin level in pure actions.
The crucial fact in applying our result to finite automata and bounded recall is that any strategy implementable by a bounded automaton or bounded recall has also a bounded entropy. This implies that the subset of player 1's strategies with a large enough entropy bound contains a face spanned by bounded automata or bounded recall strategies. Therefore, the maxmin value for player 1 on this subset is at least the corresponding value, which is equal to the value, of the repeated game with finite automata or bounded recall. This enables us to deduce the conjectures mentioned above as corollaries of our theorem. For example, in Section 7, we will consider the finitely repeated game G n in which player 1's mŽ n.
Ž . strategies are restricted to those implementable by automata with m n states, a function of the number of repetitions n, and then study the n Ž asymptotics of its value, V . We will see that the number of the mŽ n.
. Ž . O mŽ n. equivalence classes of such pure strategies is of the order m n and Ž Ž .
Ž .. any mixture of such strategies has entropy of the order O m n log m n . Now a main result of Section 6 implies that for every ) 0 there is ␥ ) 0 such that for any mixed strategy of player 1 whose entropy is a sufficiently small fraction of n, i.e., at most ␥ n, player 2 has a counterstrategy which holds player 1's average payoff within of U#, the maxmin payoff in pure Ž . Ž . actions of the stage game. This in turn implies that if m n log m n ª 0 as n ª ϱ, then the maxmin payoff to player 1 in G n tends to U# as its minimax value is indeed its value V n . mŽ n.
Let us make a precautionary remark: we are not suggesting that our entropy concept is a measure of strategic complexity in the way that the size of an automaton or the length of recall is intended to be. Our view in this paper is that entropy captures an abstract informational feature common in automata and bounded recall restrictions and thereby serves as a useful tool to analyze them.
A basic model of repeated games is described in the next section. In Section 3 we review some information theoretic concepts such as entropy and conditional entropy. Section 4 is devoted to the definition of strategic entropy and its variants. We discuss the relation between strategic entropy and the ordinary entropy of a strategy in Section 5. Section 6 contains the main results on repeated games with bounded strategic entropy. Section 7 is devoted to an application of the theorem to finite automata and bounded recall which gives positive resolutions to the two conjectures of Ž . Neyman 1997 . Section 8 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
Henceforth, ‫ގ‬ denotes the set of all positive integers, and ‫ޒ‬ denotes the w x set of all real numbers. For any x g ‫,ޒ‬ x is the integer part of x. For any Ž . set ⌰, we denote the set of all probability distributions on it by ⌬ ⌰ . The n-fold Cartesian product of ⌰ is denoted by ⌰ n . For any probability p Ž . resp. a random variable X , the expectation operator with respect to p Ž . Ž . resp. the distribution of X is denoted by E resp. E . p X Ž . Let G s A, B, r be a two-person zero-sum game in strategic form where A and B are finite sets of pure actions for player 1 and 2, respectively, and r: A = B ª ‫ޒ‬ is the payoff matrix of player 1, the maximizer. A mixed action is a probability distribution on the set of pure Ž . Ž . actions. Thus ⌬ A and ⌬ B are the sets of mixed actions of the two players.
We denote the maxmin¨alue in pure actions and the¨alue of G by
. Given a game G s A, B, r , we next describe a new game in which G is played repeatedly. Each of the repetitions is referred to as a stage and G as the stage game. At each stage, each player independently takes a stage game action. The pair of actions is announced to both players and the transfer of the corresponding payoff from one player to the other takes place. The information structure of the repeated game is that of perfect recall. That is, at any stage each player remembers all information he Ž . received the sequence of actions taken by both players up to that stage. This description is common knowledge. The formal description follows.
Ž . ϱ A play of a repeated game is an infinite sequence s , where
We denote the set of all plays by ⍀ , i.e., ⍀ s 
with s g S resp. t s t with t g T . Thus the sets of n ns1 n n n n s1 n n pure strategies of the two players are S s = S and T s = T . We n n nG 1 nG 1 consider S and T to be endowed with the product topologies with the discrete topology on each factor. Then they are compact metrizable spaces. Denote by S S and T T the Borel -algebra of S and T, respectively. A mixed Ž . Ž .Ž Ž .. strategy of player 1 resp. 2 is then a probability on S, S S resp. T, T T . Ž . Ž . ϱ A beha¨ioral strategy of player 1 resp. 2 is a sequence s n ns1 Ž Ž . ϱ . Ž . resp. s where resp. is a measurable mapping from
By a slight abuse of notation we denote ϱ ny1 Ž . Ž . by ⌬ S and ⌬ T the sets of all mixed and behavioral strategies of players 1 and 2, respectively. A pure strategy is considered to be a special Ž . degenerate case of mixed and behavioral strategy.
Ž . Ž . ϱ Every pair of pure strategies s, t induces a play s g ⍀ ,
where is defined inductively as follows:
Ž .
Note that s and t , being A A -measurable, are constant everywhere.
Ž . Accordingly, every pair , g ⌬ S = ⌬ T induces a probability P , Ž . Ž . on ⍀ , A A . Equivalently, , induces a sequence of random actions, or
variable. The expectation operator with respect to P will be denoted by
For each n g ‫ގ‬ we define the n-average payoff function r :
Ž . uous on S = T. The continuity extends to ⌬ S = ⌬ T with respect to the product topology with the weak U topology on each factor. In this paper we study three classes of repeated games differentiated by their payoff functions:
Undiscounted Game G , where the payoff from s, t is evaluated by the Cesaro limit of the induced sequence of stage payoffs, i.e., Ž . lim r s, t .
nªϱ n
For the undiscounted game G ϱ , the above Cesaro limit does not necessarily exist. We will supplement this loose end by being explicit in the description of the solution concepts in Section 6.3.
For each n g ‫,ގ‬ two pure strategies are said to be n-equivalent if, against any pure strategy of the other player, they induce n-equivalent plays. If two pure strategies induce the same play against any strategy of the other player, they are said to be equi¨alent. Extending this notion to mixed and behavioral strategies, we say that two strategies of a player are n-equivalent if, against any strategy of the other player, they induce the Ž . same probability on ⍀ , A A . The equivalence of two strategies is similarly ϱ n defined by replacing A A by A A above. Perfect recall implies that every n ϱ Ž mixed strategy has an equivalent behavioral strategy and vice versa Kuhn's . theorem .
REVIEW OF INFORMATION THEORETIC CONCEPTS
Throughout this section we deal with finite random variables and distributions. For a more general, measure theoretic, treatment of entropy, see Ž .
Let ⌰ be a finite set. Let X be a random variable which takes values in Ž . Ž . Ž . ⌰ and whose distribution is p g ⌬ ⌰ , i.e., p s Prob X s for each g ⌰. Note that the distribution p can be considered as a real random Ž . variable on ⌰ so that the expectation with respect to p of a measurable transformation of p itself is well defined.
Ý g⌰ where 0 log 0 is defined to be 0.
To fix the unit, we take the logarithm to the base 2, and we say that entropy is measured in bits. For example, the entropy of tossing a fair coin once is 1 bit, twice is 2 bits, and so on.
It is obvious by the definition that the entropy of a random variable depends only on its distribution and not on the particular values it takes.
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Ž . Thus we also write H p for the quantity in the above definition and Ž . regard H as a function on ⌬ ⌰ .
Entropy possesses a number of desirable properties as a measure of uncertainty of a random variable or a probability distribution. If one interprets the amount of uncertainty removed as the amount of information gained, then the entropy also measures the amount of information contained in a random variable or a probability distribution. The notion of entropy can be extended to an arbitrary finite dimensional vector of random variables or probability distributions. In Definition 3.1 Ž . simply replace a random variable X by a random vector X s X , . . . , X 1 n and the range ⌰ by = n ⌰ , where each ⌰ is the range of X and is Ž < . X when we can observe X . Formally, let us define a function h X X :
where h X is the value of h X X at g ⌰ . We consider h X X Ž . as a random variable on ⌰ equipped with distribution p X .
cavity of the entropy and Jensen's inequality imply that
That is, the conditioning reduces the entropy. The strict concavity of H implies, moreover, that the equality holds if, and only if, X and X are 1 2 independent. The next proposition states that the uncertainty of a pair of random variables is the uncertainty of one plus the remaining uncertainty of the other given the first. The proof is a simple marshaling of the definitions.
Ž . See Cover and Thomas 1991, Chap. 2 .
One can easily verify this in a simple example:
given below:
Hence by induction the ''chain rule'' for entropy is proved:
An extension of the entropy measure to stochastic processes is called entropy rate and is defined as follows.
be a stochastic process where each X n ns1 n ϱ ŽŽ .. Ž . takes values in a finite set ⌰. The entropy rate H X of X is n nn s1
defined by
Thus the entropy rate is the upper limit of the average uncertainty per bit of the process. For example, for an i.i.d. process the entropy rate coincides with the entropy of the common distribution. This follows immediately from Proposition 3.3 with the i.i.d. assumption. Since
If we were to define entropy rate as the limit rather than the upper limit, it would not necessarily exist. Consider, for example, two Bernoulli random 1 1 Ž .
Ž . variables X and Y whose distributions are 1, 0 and , , respectively. Construct an independent sequence consisting of a string of X s followed by an exponentially longer string of Ys followed further by a still exponen-Ž . Ž . tially longer string of X s and so on, so that 1rk H X , . . . , X oscillates 1 k between 0 and 1. However, it can be shown that for any stationary process the entropy rate, defined as the limit, does exist and coincide with the limit
STRATEGIC ENTROPY
We start with an example which illuminates the heuristics behind the concepts we define in this section and motivates the use of entropy concepts discussed in the previous section. EXAMPLE 4.1. Consider the twice repetition of a stage game in which player 1 has two actions, T and B, and player 2 also has two actions, L and R. The game is depicted in Figure 2 .
We represent a player's pure strategy by an ordered five-tuple. For Ž . example, T, B, T, T, B represents player 1's strategy which assigns the action T in the first stage, i.e., at the information set I , B in the second 1 Ž . stage after the history T, L , i.e., at the information set I , T at I , and so selected by , no matter what strategy player 2 uses, he will never be able to tell which is actually selected. Now suppose that has selected s . Let
Player 2's actions in the second stage will be . irrelevant in the subsequent discussion. After the first stage player 2 observes that player 1 has taken the action T, and thus concludes that the realized strategy must be either s , s , or s . Will player 2 ever be able to 1 2 3 narrow down the realization of further? The answer is no. All that player 2 observes at the end of the game is that player 1 has chosen T in From this example it is clear that, by using a pure strategy t, player 2 can only distinguish those pure strategies of player 1 in the support of his mixed strategy which give rise to different play of the game against t and Ž nothing more. In other words, the amount of information the reduction of . uncertainty about player 1's strategy obtained by using a pure strategy t is precisely the amount of information offered by the play induced by Ž . , t . This motivates us to look at the information on the induced play measured by entropy. The following discussion focuses on player 1's strategy. It will be an easy task to extend the concepts defined below to games with an arbitrary number of players. See Section 8.
be the random play induced by
Then H : t is defined to be the entropy of this random play up to stage n, that is,
Recall that H H is the partition of ⍀ with respect to actions in the first n n ϱ n Ž . stages. Thus H : t is the uncertainty about the play up to stage n that player 2 faces when player 1 uses and player 2 uses t. The dual interpretation is that it is the amount of information on the play of the game that player 2 can obtain using t when player 1 uses .
n Ž . Let us discuss some properties of the function H и : и . Fix t g T. Each Ž . g ⌬ S induces a probability distribution P on the finite set of , t Ž . n-histories. Its support is the set of n-histories induced by s, t for some s in the support of . Note that, with t fixed, the number of n-histories in < < n Ž . the support of P is at most A . Therefore by Proposition 3.1 1 we see , t n Ž . < < that H и : и is bounded by n log A . Since the probability P is continu-
n Ž . From the above definition it is also easy to see that H и : t is a concave Ž . function on ⌬ S for each fixed t g T. The strict concavity, however, does not hold. For example, suppose that two strategies and X differ only on those histories that would not be realized against a particular t. Let 
The next lemma follows directly from Proposition 3.3.
The quantity H X X , . . . , X may be interpreted as the average
Ž . uncertainty of actions at stage k given the k y 1 -history induced by Ž . Ž < . , t . One can think of H X X , . . . , X as per-stage average reduc-
Ž tion of uncertainty about or a pure strategy selected by if is a . mixed strategy when player 2 uses t. In this context Lemma 4.1 states that the average overall reduction of uncertainty, which is the gain of informan Ž . tion, about up to stage n using t is precisely H : t .
Ž . This lemma provides an alternative proof of Proposition 4.1 5 . Given Ž . the history up to stage k y 1, the actions at stage k, X s a , b , has k k k randomness only on the part of player 1's action a whose entropy is at k < < Ž . Ž < most log A . Thus, for every k y 1 -history, , . . . , , h X , . . . , 1 ky1 k 1 . < < Ž < . < < F log A , and hence H X X , . . . , X F log A . Therefore, by
Ž . the unconditional entropy H X of the action at stage k can be larger k < < than log A . EXAMPLE 4.2. Consider the game of Example 4.1. See Fig. 2 . We Ž . Ž . Ž . denote by p, q a mixed action of player 1 player 2 that takes T L with Ž . Ž . ϱ probability p and B R with probability q s 1 y p. Define s n ns1 
Ž .
Ž . For n ) 2, t is an arbitrary pure action. It is easily verified that X is n 2 Ä 4 Ä 4 Ž . uniformly distributed on T, B = R, L and hence H X s log 4 ) log 2 2 < < s log A .
This example also shows that even if player 1's actions are independent Ž . from stage to stage, the pair of random actions X s a , b induced by n n n Ž . , t are not necessarily so. This is because player 2's stage actions do depend on the past histories.
n Ž . One may consider two alternatives for the extension of H и : и to Ž .
Ž . Ž . ⌬ S = ⌬ T . One is the linear extension: for g ⌬ T , let us define n Ž . w n Ž .x H : s E H : t . This quantity may be interpreted as the average uncertainty of the play that player 2 faces when he uses against , or the average amount of information on the play that player 2 can obtain using against . The other alternative is to look directly at the random Ž . play up to stage n induced by , and take its entropy. We denote this n Ž . by H , . It is the uncertainty of the play up to stage n when one is informed only of the distributions and but not their realizations. Since n Ž . n Ž . H , t s H : t for each t g T, it is indeed an extension of the Ž . n Ž . original function on ⌬ S = T. In general, H , is greater than the n Ž . linear extension H : because of the concavity of the entropy.
Ž . For each g ⌬ S , we now define the n-strategic entropy of to be the n Ž . maximum of H : t , where the maximum is taken over all pure strategies t g T of player 2. n Ž .
Ž . DEFINITION 4.1. The n-strategic entropy H of g ⌬ S is defined by
Ž . Ž .
tgT Ž . n Ž . By Proposition 4.1 1 , H : и is continuous on the compact set T, and Ž . so the above maximum does exist. Proposition 4.1 4 offers a more intun Ž . itive argument for the existence of the maximum: H : и is constant on each n-equivalence classes of T, and since there are only a finite number of the n-equivalence classes, the maximum exists. With the above discusn Ž . n Ž . sion of the extension of H и : и in mind, we can also write H s n Ž . Ž . Ž . max H : . Proposition 4.1 1 and 4 imply, moreover, that the g ⌬ŽT .
n Ž . n-strategic entropy H , considered as a function of , is the maximum of essentially a finite number of continuous functions of . Therefore, n Ž . n Ž . H is continuous in . The n-strategic entropy H , unlike the entropy, is not a concave function in . This is well expected in light of Ž . Ž . n Ž . Proposition 4.1 2 and 4 since they imply that H is the maximum of Ž . a finite number of concave functions. See also Example 4.3 d below. Although we will not utilize it in this paper, it is also of interest to consider Ž . the lower n-strategic entropy of g ⌬ S defined by
tgT which preserves the concavity. This is the lower bound of the uncertainty of the play up to stage n that player 2 faces no matter what pure strategy she uses against . We provide some examples to facilitate the understanding of the n-strategic entropy.
Ž . EXAMPLE 4.3. a Any pure strategy has zero n-strategic entropy for every n. Any strategy that is n-equivalent to a pure strategy has zero n-strategic entropy. This is trivial because such a strategy, by definition, induces pure actions against any pure strategy of player 2 up to stage n. Conversely, if a strategy has zero n-strategic entropy, then it is necessarily n-equivalent to a pure strategy.
Ž .
Ž . ϱ b Suppose that s is an independent sequence of mixed k ks1
Ž . Ž . ϱ actions, s ␣ g ⌬ A . Take t g T and let X be the random play 
Ž . Specification of and X for n ) 2 is irrelevant to the subsequent Ž . . Fig. 1 , we have
Ž . n Ž . < < e Proposition 4.1 5 implies that H is bounded by n log A . Let ␣ be the mixed action of player 1 which is uniformly distributed on A.
Ž . From the argument of b above it follows that if plays the i.i.d. n Ž . < < sequence of ␣ , then H s n log A . There are other strategies that Ž . ϱ attain this bound. Again, in the game of Example 4.1, define s n ns1 as follows: Ž . Ž X . that s, t and s , t induce n-equivalent plays, then player 2, using this t, can never tell which one was actually selected within the first n stages. In Ž . n Ž X . n other words, the uncertainty about s and s persists even at the k ks1 k ks1 Ž end of stage n. This suggests that the reduction of uncertainty about a . pure strategy selected by in the first n stages using t, which is n Ž . H : t , is smaller than the uncertainty of as a probability on the first n Ž . n stage strategies. Denote by H the entropy of viewed as a nˆn Ž .
probability on = S . We call H the n-entropy of . In this section k ks1
we will show that the n-strategic entropy of is at most its n-entropy.
For this purpose it is convenient to introduce the concept of the entropy Ž . of a partition. Let ⌽, F F, be a probability space and let P P be a finite partition of ⌽ into F F-sets. The entropy of the partition P P with respect to is defined by
The next proposition states that the coarsening of a partition cannot Ž . increase entropy. See Smorodinsky 1971 . PROPOSITION 5.1 . If a partition P P is a coarsening of a partition Q Q, i. e., e¨ery element of P P is a union of elements of Q Q, then
Recall that S s = S , where S is a finite set of stage k strategies.
Let P P be the finite partition of S induced 6 by = n S . The algebra on S n n ks1 generated by P P is denoted by S S . We denote by S S the -algebra on S n n Ž . generated by D S S . A mixed strategy is thus a probability on S, S S . nG 1 n Ž . Since P P is a finite partition of S into S S-sets, its entropy H P P is n n n Ž . defined as above. It is clear from the definition of P P that H s n Ž .
Given player 2's pure strategy t, we say that s and s X in S are Ž . Ž . n-equivalent with respect to t, or n, t -equivalent for short, if s, t and Ž X . Ž. s , t induce n-equivalent plays. Since n, t -equivalence is an equivalence Ž . relation on S, it induces a partition of S denoted by P P t . Thus with each n Ž .
Ž . D D g P P t is associated an n-history C s D g H H in one-to-one and n n onto manner. Therefore,
Ž . Clearly, P P t is a coarsening of P P . Indeed, P P t is a coarsening of the n n n partition of S into the n-equivalence classes which is in turn a coarsening nˆn Ž . Ž . of P P . Therefore it follows from Proposition 5.1 that H : t F H n for every t g T. By taking the maximum over t we see that the n-strategic nˆn Ž . Ž . entropy of does not exceed its n-entropy: H F H . Conse-n Ž . Ž . Ž . quently, H is at most lim sup 1rn H , and hence so is the nªϱ ϱ Ž . strategic entropy rate H .
THE REPEATED GAMES WITH ENTROPY BOUND
In this section we study the three classes of repeated games each with a restriction on player 1's strategies in terms of one of the three strategic entropy concepts formulated in Section 4. All the results in this section are based on the main lemma which we present first.
Ž .
Observe that if g ⌬ S has a very small n-strategic entropy, then Lemma 4.1 implies that the entropy of player 1's stage action must necessarily be small at most of the first n stages, i.e., it is ''close to'' a pure action. So if player 2 plays a one-shot best response at every stage, the n-average payoff for player 1 will be close to his maxmin value in pure actions of the stage game. This is the heuristics for the lemma below. Note Ž . ϱ that if X is the random play induced by a pair of strategies, then
is A A -measurable. By a slight abuse of notation we
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that 0 F r F 1. We shall Ž . 
Without loss of generality suppose that is a behav-
That is, t takes a best response action against at every k-history. Let
be the random play induced by , t .
k ks1
The second and third properties of entropy in Proposition 3.1 imply that
r , where I и is the indicator func-
tion. Notice that both sides of this inequality are measurable with respect to A A and recall our assumption 0 F r F 1. Then at every stage k we
Using the above inequality together with Lemma 4.1 and the definition of n Ž . H , we obtain the following:
Ž .
This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
n Ž .
The Finitely Repeated Game G
We will modify the finitely repeated game G n by restricting the set of player 1's strategies. This is done by imposing an exogenous bound on the n-strategic entropy of his strategies. Player 2's strategy set remains intact.
n Ž . For ) 0, let ⌺ be the set of player 1's strategies whose n-strategic n Ž . Ä Ž .< n Ž .
Ž . Ž . ous on ⌬ S = T. Thus, for each g ⌬ S , r , и is continuous on the n Ž . compact set T and hence min r , t is well defined and continuous in t g T n n Ž . n Ž . . As ⌺ is compact, the maxmin value of G , W n s max min r , t ,
Ž . Ž .
n n Ž . tgT g⌺ is well-defined.
n Ž . As illustrated in the next example, the set ⌺ is in general not convex. Therefore, the minimax theorem does not apply to the game n Ž . n Ž . G . Consequently, the value of G need not exist. Since pure n Ž . strategies have zero n-strategic entropy, S ; ⌺ for every G 0. So the 
Consider the bound on the n-strategic entropy to be a function of the number of repetitions, i.e., : ‫ގ‬ ª ‫.ޒ‬ We are interested in the asymptotics n Ž Ž .. Ž . of W n . The next theorem asserts that if n grows more slowly than any linear function of n, then the unrestricted player 2 can asymptotically hold player 1's payoff down to his maxmin value in pure actions of the stage game.
Ž .
n Ž Ž .. Ž . THEOREM 6.1. If lim n rn s 0, then lim W n s U# G .
nªϱ nªϱ
Ž . Proof. Player 1 can guarantee himself at least U# G at every stage n Ž Ž .. Ž . using a pure action, and hence W n G U# G for every n. It follows n Ž Ž .. Ž . that lim inf W n G U# G . nªϱ Ž . Next, take ) 0 arbitrarily. Let ␥ ) 0 be as specified in Lemma 6.1.
Ž . By the condition of the theorem, there is n such that for, every Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . n G n , we have n F ␥ n. Then by Lemma 6.1, for every n G n n Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž . and every g ⌺ n , r , t F U# G q , where t is as defined in n n Ž Ž .. Ž . the proof of the lemma. This shows that lim sup W n F U# G q nªϱ . As this inequality holds for every ) 0, we conclude that n Ž Ž .. Ž . lim sup W n F U# G , which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
nªϱ Ž . It is easy to see that if n rn is bounded away from zero, then n Ž Ž .. Ž . W n is bounded away from U# G provided, of course, that there is a Ž . feasible payoff in G for player 1 which is strictly greater than U# G . Consider, for example, the matching pennies of Example 6.1. Suppose that 1 Ž . Ž x n s n for every n for some 0 -F 1. Let p g 0, be such that
w Ž .x n and min E r a , b s y1 q 2 p for every k. Therefore
In this section we consider the -discounted game. In contrast to the previous section, we will impose a bound on the total strategic entropy of player 1's strategies. Again, player 2's strategy set remains intact. We will also show that bounding the strategic entropy rate is not an essential restriction in the discounted game. Let us start with a lemma which is an analogue of Lemma 6.1.
w . U Ž . Ž . Ž . whene¨er g 0, 1 and H F r 1 y .
Proof. As a preparatory step, we express the -discounted payoff as an
s nr , y n y 1 r , ,
Ž . where we set r , s 0. From this it follows that, for each m g ‫,ގ‬ Assume, again, that 0 F r F 1. Let ) 0 be given. Lemma 6.1 implies Ž . Ž . that there is ␥ ) 0 such that for every n and g ⌬ S n r , t F U# GI H G ␥ n .
6. 2
Ž ny 1 n . Using 6.1 and 6.2 , and as Ý 1 y y n s 1, we have
Write n , for r2 1 y and Ž . U Ž . Ž . Ž . for ␥ r2. Then, for every with H F r 1 y , the last Ž . term in 6.3 is bounded by
Ž . which, together with 6.3 , completes the proof.
U Ž . For G 0 let G be the -discounted game in which player 1's strategies are restricted to those with total strategic entropy at most .
n By an argument analogous to the one in the previous section, one can U Ž . show that the maxmin value of G ,
tgT g⌺ is well defined. We will consider the bound on the total strategic entropy w . to be a function of the discount factor, : 0, 1 ª ‫ޒ‬ , and study the q U Ž Ž .. asymptotics of W as ª 1.
Note that a -discounted game can be viewed as a finitely repeated game whose number of repetitions is a geometrically distributed random Ž . variable with mean 1r 1 y . With this view, the next theorem is compa-Ž . rable to Theorem 6.1. It asserts that if grows more slowly than any Ž . U Ž Ž .. Ž . linear function of 1r 1 y , then W converges to U# G as tends to 1.
Ž .
Proof. Since player 1 can guarantee U# G by a pure strategy and
Ž . w . Let ) 0 be given. By the condition of the theorem there is g 0, 1 w Ž . . Ž . Ž . Ž . such that, for every g , 1 , we have F r 1 y , where Ž . w Ž . . ) 0 is as specified in Lemma 6.2. Then, for every g , 1 and
Ž . lim sup W F U# G q . As ) 0 was taken arbitrarily, we ª 1 have the desired result.
To conclude this subsection we demonstrate that in the -discounted game there is an -optimal strategy with zero strategic entropy rate for every ) 0. Therefore, putting a bound on the strategic entropy rate is not a restriction in the discounted games.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that 0 F r F 1. Given g w . Ž . ϱ ky1 0, 1 and ) 0, choose m large enough so that 1 y Ý -.
ks mq1 U Ž . Let ␣ be an optimal mixed action of player 1 in the stage game G, i.e.,
n s 1, . . . , m, s ␣ U regardless of the history, and for n ) m, is an n n arbitrary pure action. Ž . ϱ Observe that, for any t g T, if X is the random play induced by n ns1
as n ª ϱ. Hence i . By playing , regardless of player 2's strategy, player Ž . 1 receives an expected payoff at least Val G at every stage up to stage m and at least 0 thereafter. Therefore, by the choice of m, player 1's Ž . Ž . discounted payoff is at least 1 y Val G , which in turn is at least Ž . Ž . Val G y under the assumption r F 1. This proves ii .
The above phenomenon is due to the facts that a the definition of strategic entropy rate does not impose any restriction on the entropy of Ž . the induced play in finite stages and b with discounting, payoffs in the distant future have little effect on the present value. We will see in the next section that in the undiscounted games, where payoffs in a finite number of stages have no effect on the overall payoff, a bound on the strategic entropy rate has an appreciable effect on what the restricted player can guarantee in the long run.
For each ␥ G 0 the game G ␥ is the infinite repetitions of G in which player 1's strategies are restricted to those that have strategic entropy rate ϱ Ž . Ä Ž .< ϱ Ž . 4 at most ␥. Define ⌺ ␥ s g ⌬ S H F ␥ . The set of strategies Ž . available to player 2 remains ⌬ T .
For a payoff x to be a maxmin value of an infinitely repeated game, it is natural to require two things. First, player 1 should be able to ''guarantee'' himself x in the sense that he has a strategy that yields something very close to x in a long run regardless of player 2's strategy. Such a strategy Ž . may depend on how close the payoff should be to x -optimality . Second, player 2 should be able to ''defend'' x in the sense that, for every strategy of player 1, player 2 has a counterstrategy that prevents player 1 from gaining substantially more than x in a long run. Again such a counterstrategy may depend not only on player 1's strategy but also on how close the resulting payoff should be to x. The next theorem asserts in particular ϱ Ž . Ž . that the maxmin value of G 0 equals U# G . It asserts, moreover, that Ž . the payoff U# G has stronger properties than the two requirements defining the maxmin value.
Proof. Player 1 can obtain at least U# G at every stage using a pure Ž . Ž . ϱ Ž . action. This proves i . To prove ii , take with H s 0. Let t g T be as in Lemma 6.1, and let ) 0 be given. Then by the definition of
Ž . where ␥ is as specified in Lemma 6.1. Therefore, r , t F U# G q n . This completes the proof.
BOUNDED COMPLEXITY AND STRATEGIC ENTROPY
In this section we will apply Theorem 1 to repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall. The fact that any probability distribution over k points has entropy at most log k plays a crucial role in the subsequent discussion. initial state, f : Q ª A is an action function, and g: Q = B ª Q is a Ž transition function. Player 2's automaton is defined by substituting A with . B. By the size of an automaton we mean the cardinality of the set of its < < states Q , which may be infinite. A finite automaton is an automaton of a finite size.
An automaton M plays a repeated game as follows. At each stage n it Ž . takes an action prescribed by f for the current state, say q , i.e., f q ; it is n n set for q at the first stage. Then it changes its state to q specified by g Conversely, every pure strategy of player 1 has a representation by an automaton, possibly of an infinite size. If a pure strategy s is equivalent to a pure strategy induced by an automaton, we say that s is implementable by that automaton. Here we set a bound on the size of automata that player 1 may use so that not all pure strategies are available to him. For each m g ‫ގ‬ let FA be the set of all pure strategies implementable Thus it is obvious, nonetheless important to realize, that in studying the value of a game, if it exists, we can focus our attention on either the minimax value or the maxmin value. It is the latter that we utilize in the subsequent discussion. We consider the bound on the size of automata to be a function of the number of repetitions, m: ‫ގ‬ ª ‫,ގ‬ and study the asymptotics of V n . It is mŽ n. 
Ž .
Ž . Assume that m n log m n rn ª 0 as n ª ϱ. By Theorem 6.1 the right-Ž . hand side of the above inequality converges to U# G as n ª ϱ. Thus part of the proof involves constructing an equilibrium path and punishment strategies for a deviation from it. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 ensure the existence of effective punishment strategies of player 2.
